

Why Do People “Renounce War”?

The War Experiences of the Daasanach in the Conflict-ridden Area of Northeast Africa

Toru Sagawa



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Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies

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Working Paper Series No.42

2009

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Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies
1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu,
Shiga, JAPAN

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ISBN 978 4-903625-69-0

The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies.

The publication of the Working Paper Series is supported by the Academic Frontier Centre (AFC) research project “In Search of Societal Mechanisms and Institutions for Conflict Resolution: Perspectives of Asian and African Studies and Beyond” (2005-2009), funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ryukoku University.

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Introduction

1. Anthropological Study on War

The purposes of this paper are, by focusing on the oral statements of individuals and their decision-making processes, to elucidate the kinds of experiences the Daasanach people, who inhabit an area where inter-ethnic warfare frequently occurs, undergo on the battlefield; and to shed light on the effect of these experiences of warfare that exert on their choice of action when subsequent wars occur.

Hitherto, there has been a certain accumulation of anthropological research on the theme of war, but the greater part of this research has understood war in terms of environmental factors and the norms of groups existing outside of the individual. Rarely is it that research seeks to apprehend war from the viewpoint of the individual.

This tendency is scrupulously attended to in the argument of Harrison (1993), who has had a strong influence on anthropological war research in recent years. According to Harrison, war is not something that is set in motion against an unacquainted other, but rather, the two parties have exchanged contacts on a daily basis and have formed friendly relations. However, the groups' identities as independent political entities cannot be formed as long as this chain of relations exists. War is therefore “a mechanism for creating discrete groups through the attempted negation of their pre-existing interrelations” (Harrison 1993: 18).

This argument has been evaluated highly by many anthropologists. Turton, for example, while adopting Harrison's analytical framework, has stated that for the Mursi and their neighboring agro-pastoral peoples of southwest Ethiopia, “the activity of warfare...can be seen as a common ritual language, a system of shared meanings by which groups make themselves significant to each other and to themselves, as independent political entities” (Turton 1994: 26).

* This research was supported by the 21st Century COE Program “Aimed for COE of Integrated Area Studies” of Kyoto University.

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What we can sometimes glimpse in the background to these arguments is the teleological premise that the setting in motion of warfare creates and clarifies a boundary between friend and foe by mobilizing the members of the group in a homogenous manner for the activity of warfare. In the “exceptional circumstances” of the setting in motion of warfare, the carrying on of the daily lives of individuals becomes suspended by cultural apparatuses such as the “men’s cult” (Harrison 1993) or “a system of shared meanings” (Turton 1994), as they are mobilized for war in order to assert their political identity as an “us” different from “them” (cf. Schmitt 1996).

This way of looking at war, however, has two problems. One is that it looks at individuals as if they were beings that simply act subserviently to external norms when war is set in motion. This view is to some extent appropriate when analyzing warfare between nation states from the 19th century onward. The vast majority of individuals, being bound up in the state ideology apparatus, are willingly mobilized for war in the name of the “defense of the homeland,” and the few individuals who refuse to be mobilized are ostracized through physical violence from the police organizations. Thus it is that at a time of warfare a homogenous “nation” appears. However, whether this view can be justified as a framework for the analysis of warfare in times and areas where different political regimes hold sway is a problem that should be given consideration.

I believe that anthropological research on warfare “must deny it [war] special status” (Richards 2005: 3) from the outset. Research on warfare as a “human aporia,” in its over-dedication to investigation of the “ultimate” cause of war, has had a strong tendency to handle war as an entity independent of other societal phenomena (cf. Nordstrom 1995: 138). However, warfare itself is a phenomenon that arises in a society where there are a variety of agents, and it is inappropriate to reduce its cause to a single factor. That is, warfare is not “so exceptional [phenomenon] as to require ‘special’ explanatory effort” (Richards 2005: 3), but should be grasped as something that is set in motion or avoided as the result of the accumulation of the choices of action taken by each individual as he or she is influenced by a variety of factors.

A further problem is that, by simply analyzing the causes and functions of warfare, sufficient consideration is not taken on the violence that is actually expressed on the battlefield. If it is a fact that the framework for mobilization differs for wars that take place in different times and areas, then what is the indicator by which we can place any particular phenomenon in a category called “war”? One of the most important indicators might be that, although there are differences of extent, unconcealed physical violence in which bodily injury is caused to oneself and others is collectively exercised in the arena of series of interactions.

It is pointed out by many scholars (e.g., Arendt 1970; Riches 1986) that even if a specific function is attached to warfare in the society involved, there is a tendency for the violence exercised as the means in the battlefield to run out of control over and above the purpose that was originally intended. Focusing on the cause and function of warfare and simply analyzing it as “a meaningful cultural act”

may serve to conceal the violence expressed on battlefields (Tanaka 1998). In research that views warfare from the point of view of individuals, it is necessary to ask what kinds of violence are exercised in warfare and what that violence means to the individuals who exercise or are the object of that violence, and what effect this has on the psychology of people (cf. Kurimoto 2005).

2. The Perspective of This Paper

The Daasanach, the subject of this paper, have intermittently but repeatedly fought with the four adjacent peoples. Daasanach males are characterized as individuals who should “naturally” go off to war as they reach adulthood. However, they are not homogenously mobilized when warfare is set in motion. This paper analyzes the factors at work when Daasanach males make a choice whether to go to war or not.

In order to achieve this, the author conducted an interview survey concerning the past war experiences of 174 adult Daasanach males. The reason why this methodology was chosen was in consideration for the methodological problems that afflict research on inter-group relations. In contrast to intra-group relations, which can be observed every day in a settlement, the everyday observation of interactions between groups presents difficulties. Consequently, there is a tendency to resort to general statements such as “an antagonistic relationship exists between group A and group B” without ever giving consideration to diversity within the groups. That is, we could conjecture that the argument that “the setting in motion of warfare creates and reinforces the ‘we’ consciousness,” is possibly the result of the researcher carrying out the analysis at the level of the group rather than indicating the realities of the phenomenon (cf. Tronvoll 2005).

In contrast, this paper, by quantitatively comparing the number of times each individual has participated in war, and describing the appearance of battlefields as expressed in the narrative of the respondents, is able to clarify aspects that have been overlooked in previous research.

The structure of this paper is explained as follows. In section I, the social structure of the Daasanach, and in section II, their modes of warfare will be respectively outlined. In section III, their motivation for going to war will be indicated and the cultural apparatus for mobilizing people for war will be clarified. In section IV, the factors at work in making a decision to go or not to go to war will be shown from data concerning the number of times a male has participated in warfare. Section V will consider the logic by which the decision of an individual to go or not go to war is accepted by other members of the group. The data used in this paper was obtained through the fieldwork conducted between February and September 2006.

It should be stated here firstly that, on account of limited space, the historical influence from the outside world on this area is not mentioned in this paper. This area is located on the outermost periphery of the state structure, and even today the influence of the center is relatively tenuous.

However, since military conquest by the Ethiopian Empire at the end of the 19th century, the relations between the Daasanach and the adjacent peoples has changed due to intervention by the state, and the influx of firearms has caused the severity of violence in the area to increase (Sagawa 2007, 2009). As of 2006, 48% (n = 163) of adult men of Daasanach possess guns.

However, what should not be misunderstood is that “a peaceful local society without war” did not exist in this area prior to contact with state power. What is indirectly asked by this paper is, while the antagonism of inter-ethnic relations was exacerbated by external influences, what practices by people prevented the totalization of war and constructed some sort of “order” in inter-ethnic relations.




Figure 1: The Daasanach and their Neighboring Groups

Note: DAASANACH: ethnic group name; RANDAL: territorial group; Omorate: town name; -----: border

I. Daasanach

The Daasanach, an agro-pastoral people with a population of approximately 37,000, inhabit an area from southwest Ethiopia to northwest Kenya. Five other peoples inhabit the areas surrounding the Daasanach (Figure 1). All of the groups partly or strongly rely on pastoralism for their livelihoods. Of these, the Kara, who inhabit the northern area, have maintained friendly relations with the Daasanach and are classified as “our people” (*gaal kunno*). In contrast, the Turkana to the southwest, the Nyangatom to the northwest, the Hamar to the northeast, and the Gabra to the southeast are “enemies” (*kiz*). The Daasanach have fought with these groups intermittently for more than a half century.

The Daasanach people consist of eight groups, called *en*, which are the units of the co-hosting of many rituals. Since the *en* share dwelling and herding areas to some extent, they can be called territorial groups (Figure 1). In each territorial group, there are three to fourteen clans (*tuur*) whose succession is patrilineal. The clans rarely function as cooperative units in daily life, but are an important reference unit when rituals take place.

All Daasanach people belong to a generation set (*haari*). The generation sets exist for each territorial group and all hold independent initiation rites. The initiation rites are held once about every six or seven years, which members participating in the rite together form an age set (*shad*). Each generation set consists of approximately eight age sets.

Individuals undergo the initiation rite when they are about fifteen to twenty years of age, and at that time the status of males passes from boy (*nyigeny*) to youth (*kabana*). Those who go to war do so mainly when they are youths. Following this, passing through the marriage and circumcision, once the rite known as *dimi* is carried out, they are perceived of socially as elders (*karsich*). The characteristics of the Daasanach social structure is that an individual's social status is not determined by the generation set or age set that he belongs to. Some adjacent pastoral societies take rites of passage such as marriage as the opportunities for passing up to the higher age-grade, in accordance with which the status of all the members belonging to the same age set moves up from boy to youth and from youth to elder. With the Daasanach, in contrast, the timing of rites of passage following the initiation rite differs greatly even for individuals belonging to the same age set.

For example, once the initiation rite has been completed, individuals are free to marry, but, due to differences in the number of livestock owned, the ability to transfer the bridewealth, and the ability to negotiate with the family of the prospective bride, some males may marry in their mid-teens, while some are still single in their mid-twenties. Additionally, the *dimi* rite is held once a year for each territorial group, but only those individuals who are fathers whose eldest daughter has attained about ten years of age are qualified to participate. Due to the difference in the timing of marriage and birth, there will be differences in the timing of the performance of this rite for members of the same age set.

The timing of the changes in social status for Daasanach males is strongly influenced by the various factors pertaining to the individual. It is speculated that this also influences the “individualistic” tendency of the Daasanach, referred to in section V.

II. An Outline of Warfare

1. Definition of Warfare

War is generally defined as “an organized armed conflict carried out between differing political entities.” In the Daasanach language, the two words meaning “armed conflict with the enemy” are *sulla* and *osu*. Both words have in common the main purpose of killing the enemy and raiding their livestock, but differ in the scale of the violence exercised and the degree of organization.

Sulla refers to several or several tens of males in their teens and twenties, having gathered at an opportunity such as a dance at night, consulting together and setting off for the enemy’s lands as they are. In many cases there is no clear strategy, and many times they fight with a small number of the enemy who are met by coincidence on the way. Even if the enemy is encountered, the group may retreat if there are many of them, or they may return home without encountering the enemy at all.

On the other hand, *osu* involves the participation of several hundred people in the hostilities. Strategy is mulled over at a meeting of the settlement before proceeding to the battle. Further, in many cases dead and wounded occur in the exchange of fire and livestock raiding. The Daasanach state that *sulla* is a rambunctious act of a number of young men, whereas *osu* is motivated by much clearer purposes, and is organized attack planned through discussion. In view of this difference, “warfare” in this paper is referred to *osu*.

2. Process Leading to Warfare

There are three processes that lead to warfare. One is “follow the feet” (*gas veer*), where after the enemy has attacked a Daasanach settlement and raided livestock and such, the males from that settlement and adjacent settlements follow the enemy’s footprints and attack the settlement to which the enemy has returned.

The second is “think with his own head” (*meen le tawk*) in which the young men in units of age sets and the like gather, for example in the bush some distance from the settlement, to plan warfare, and then set off to fight by implementing the plan.

The third process is known as “spread the cattle hide” (*rokode gor*). The young men kill an ox and present the meat to elder males. The elders then use the entrails of the bull to divine such as the enemy’s whereabouts. After eating the meat, an elder who has strong magic powers (*nyierim*) spreads

the hide of the slaughtered ox on the ground. All the males who are to proceed to the battle walk over the hide, the elder blessing them by saying, “Go with god,” as they do so. Having received this blessing, the men set off for the enemy’s lands. To summarize, whereas warfare is set in motion with young men taking the leading role in “think with his own head,” “spread the cattle hide” is warfare that has received the permission of the elders and is of a larger scale.

3. Form of the Battlefield and Combat

Having set off from the settlement, on the way to the battlefield the fighting force will dispatch scouts (*zeg*) to reconnoitre the enemy’s lands, and a concrete plan based on the information they bring back will be determined with males having ample war experience playing the lead role.

During the warfare, men known as “people of the fire-lighting sticks” (*maa bierich*) will accompany the fighting force. Only members of two clans, the Tuurnyerim clan and Fargaar clan, which have strong magic powers, can be appointed to these posts. They have two roles. One is to bless the men by lighting fires with the sticks, and the other is to make a lesion with a knife on the ears of the enemy’s livestock on the battlefield. It is said that having thus fallen under the spell of the magician, the enemy’s livestock will all run off *en masse* to the Daasanach settlement.

Three kinds of places may become battlefields: inside a settlement, outside a settlement, or a livestock watering place. Attacks against the inside of a settlement take place around dawn. At the time of the attack, the central force (*hirdore*) begins the assault from the front of the settlement, while almost simultaneously several side forces (*nyokodonte*) attack from the sides. A livestock plunder brigade called “the spear-holders” (*naane gaie*) takes up a position behind the central force. Their role is to lead the enemy’s livestock off to the Daasanach settlement while the other forces are engaged in combat.

Battles outside a settlement take place after the morning milking in a settlement has finished and the livestock herd has come out of the village to be grazed on the pasture. In contrast to an attack on the interior of the settlement, there is no clear division of roles, and the attack is carried out such as to deploy the members widely so that they surround the livestock herd.

A battle at a watering place is an ambush. There is no grouping of forces, everyone hides in the long grass around the watering place, and when the enemy herdsmen approach the watering place with the livestock herd, they are met with a fusillade.

In many cases, the combat ends in a few hours or half a day, but in the case of a large-scale battle, the force may spend the night at the battlefield and the battle will resume the following morning. When retreating from the battlefield, there may be attacks from a pursuing force and the plundered livestock retaken.

III. Cultural Apparatus for War Mobilization

What is the motivation that induces people to go to war? The Daasanach cite three reasons: jealousy (*inaf*), debt (*eu*), and an uplifting of the body and spirit (*guof*). Each of these is related to the desire to attain prestige concerning “masculinity.” We will look at each of these in turn.

1. Jealousy and Masculinity

There are two kinds of jealousy associated with warfare. One of these is jealousy towards the enemy. In times of peace, the Daasanach often live together and herd their livestock with members of the surrounding peoples (Sagawa, in press). At that time, if it is seen that those people possess larger livestock herds than oneself or the livestock are fatter than one’s own, a person may “feel jealousy creeping in.”

The other kind of jealousy is jealousy between Daasanach people. A male who has achieved many successes in past wars may talk proudly of his bravery on the battlefield and those around him will voice their admiration for him. When they see this, young men who have not yet engaged in warfare, or those males who have not achieved any successes worth talking about in past wars will “feel jealousy creeping in.”

When they “feel jealousy creeping in,” the males wish to go off to war themselves to make good account of themselves by achieving successes. The background to the coming about of this jealousy is that there exists a cultural apparatus that acclaims as “a brave man” (*maa nyare*), a male who raids the enemy’s livestock or kills its members.

There is a specific Daasanach language word meaning “to distribute livestock raided from the enemy” (*barare*), and the raider distributes livestock after he returns to the settlement. Of the 174 adult males interviewed by the author, 67% had experienced the raiding of the enemy’s livestock in *sulla* and *osu* in which they had participated up to that time (Table 1). Figure 2 shows the people to whom the plundered livestock (cattle, sheep and goats, donkeys, camels) were distributed to.¹ The proportion of the livestock obtained by the raider himself or his wife and children was approximately 25% for all livestock types, and the remaining 75% was mainly distributed to close relatives. This distribution would ensure that the bravery and generosity of the distributor would long be a topic of people’s conversation and would contribute to the rise of his social prestige.

With respect to the killing of the enemy, 18% of the adult males had had such experiences in the past (Table 1). A male who has killed an enemy is greeted by a song extolling “a brave man” from women

¹ The data was obtained through separate interviews with 174 males concerning the people to whom livestock raided in past wars were distributed to. Where there was no recollection or obvious uncertainty concerning the person receiving the distribution, the information was excluded.

when he returns to the settlement. In order to prove that he has “actually killed an enemy,” the killer must bring home some ornaments worn by the person killed, and in the same way as with the livestock, distribute them to close relatives and friends. Following this, after passing through several rituals, he will be awarded an honorific name (*yier miti*) related to the place where the enemy was killed or some special feature of the person who was killed, and approximately 1.5-cm long incisions (*chede*) made all over his chest as a sign of his bravery.

Daasanach males are brought up surrounded from infancy by cultural apparatus that extol the exercise of violence against enemies. As adults, they become jealous of each other based on the socialized desire to gain recognition from others as a “brave man,” and go to war.

Table 1: Experience of Livestock Raiding and Killing of the Enemy

Age	Number of Informants ¹⁾	Males with Experience of Raiding Livestock (%)	Males with Experience of Killing the Enemy (%)
10s	26 (13)	30.8	3.8
20s	31 (3)	71	9.7
30s	35 (7)	57.1	20
40s	29	75.9	24.1
50s	25	80	16
60s	13	92.3	46.2
70s -	15	86.7	26.7
Total	174 (27)	67.2	18.4

¹⁾Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of informants who have not participated in warfare.




Figure 2: Recipients of the Distribution of Raided Livestock¹⁾

¹⁾ n indicates the total number of head of livestock distributed. 720 head of cattle were raided in 106 warfare participations by 71 males. 1151 head of goats and sheep were raided in 105 warfare participations by 82 males. 160 donkeys were raided in 34 warfare participations by 28 males. 44 camels were raided in 10 warfare participations by 9 males.

2. The Memory of Debt

The second motivation is the debt of past wars. Wars are also accompanied by the plunder of one's own livestock and the death of one's companions. The losses incurred in wars are called "debts" by the Daasanach. This word is also applied to the lending and borrowing of livestock and money. For example, if one's mother were killed by a Turkana, one would express this by saying, "The Turkana owe me a debt of my mother." The debt gives that person "a bad stomach;" in other words it gives him an unpleasant feeling and arouses emotions of anger (*izu*). People explain that this emotion leads to "taking back what is owed," in other words induces people to go to war with the aim of taking revenge on the enemy, and by gaining success in war "the debt will come out of the stomach," in other words the person will be freed of his anger.

The debts are not applied only to battles that have taken place in recent years. In everyday conversation, the Daasanach often speak of past battles. At these times, the conversation proceeds as mention is made of who killed an enemy, and who was killed and whose livestock was raided by the enemy in some particular battle. For example, around 1991 the Wadite War came about as a result of Kwalakol and his wife being killed when they visited a Turkana settlement for trade. During the combat, Kote was hit by a Turkana bullet and died, but at the same time 10 Daasanach men killed 14 Turkanas.

Especially when small-scale troubles arise to cause a deterioration in relations with the enemy, conversations containing such statements as, "The Turkanas never know peace and are always looking for a fight," while referring to past debts are to be heard everywhere. Before war is set in motion, hatred of the enemy is amplified through the medium of the memory of debts, and "our" solidarity is emphasized.

3. *Guof*

Even though an individual may harbor jealousy and anger, this does not soon lead to the occurrence of war. War is a collective act, and it is important to conquer fear. When the emotions of several individuals transform themselves into the collective act of war, this is known as an uplifting of the body and spirit. The word that is translated as "an uplifting of the body and spirit" is *guof*, a very difficult term to translate. When people become *guof*, they fall into a trance-like state, the breathing becoming harsh, the voice vibrating in a low tone, and the body shaking violently with rapid jumping movements.

Guof is not limited to the time before war. Summarizing from people's explanations and the author's observations of examples, the state of *guof* has the following four characteristics. (1) sexually mature men and women; (2) just prior to an important juncture in life, such as marriage, circumcision, or war; and when (3) insulting words are hurled by others based on a comparison with some other person,

then the object of the insult may become *guof*, and (4) this is often accompanied, either just before or just after, by singing and dancing in a group.

In the case of warfare, when the companions of an age set gather together, such abuse as, “You’ve never once raided any livestock, and you call yourself a man?” may be hurled at a young man, and further, in that same context, if a war song (*guo dib*) is sung *en masse*, then that young man will become *guof*. That is, a young man who has not yet shown his own “masculinity” by successes in war will become *guof* when others point this out in public. By way of this uplifting of the body and spirit, the fear that was present will be curtailed and he will go off to war with his companions in order to prove himself a “brave man.”

4. Male Menstruation

From the viewpoint of an outsider, it would seem that the jealousy and anger whipped up for war could be resolved by means other than war. According to the Daasanach, however, the participation in war of a male harboring these emotions is a “man’s menstruation” (*ir mayab*). That is, just as a female coming to sexual maturity will inevitably shed blood as her menstruation begins, so a male will become “*guof*” when maturing and set off to the battlefield to shed blood. Going off to war is something that is represented as a “natural” thing to be rightly carried out in the process of a man’s growth.

IV. Who Goes, or Does not Go, to War?

When one thinks of the hatred that is derived from the instilling of past debts and the expression “male menstruation,” one receives the impression that the Daasanach male is a being that is programmed to fight.

How often in fact do the men go to war? Table 2 shows the number of times 174 adult males have participated in warfare in the past.² If people are homogeneously mobilized for war, the number of times of warfare participation should be the same, but in fact there is a large variation. The factors involved in the explanation of this variation are investigated in this section.

1. Historical Change in Inter-ethnic Relations

First, there is a significant difference according to age. The reason for teenage males to have smaller number of participation in warfare than their elders is obvious. The number of times the young men

² The interview survey began by asking, “What was the first war you went to?” and continued on to ask the names of the wars participated in during the course of the subject undergoing each rite of passage. The data in the Table 2 include attacks on enemy settlements and defenses of one’s own settlement when the enemy has come to attack. In the latter case, the people pursue the enemy after they have withdrawn, and members from nearby settlements come to reinforce the attacked settlement. For this reason, both attacks and defenses have been classified under the expression “go to war.”

going off to war will increase later in life, and because the elder males will less likely to go to war, the difference will disappear as time goes on.

Table 2: Number of Times Adult Men have Participated in Warfare

Age	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 or more	Total Number of People	Average Number of Participations
10s	13	7	5	1								26	1.3
20s	3	5	8	6	6	1		2				31	2.6
30s	7	7	9	3	5	1	2	1				35	2.2
40s		2	3	4	4	5	7	1	1	1	1	29	4.8
50s		2	1	3	7	4	2		4	1	1	25	5
60s		1	1	1	3		4	3				13	4.8
70s -			1	2	3	3	3	1	2			15	5.1
Total	23	24	28	20	28	14	18	8	7	2	2	174	3.4

Another factor which influences the difference in averages is the historical change in inter-ethnic relations. The Daasanach and their enemies have repeatedly alternated between times of frequent war and times of relative peace. For instance, although wars with the Turkana have occurred in short cycles over the last fifty years, large-scale wars in chief broke out frequently in the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. The males who are now in their sixties and seventies or older formed the core fighting force in these wars.

On the other hand, relations with the Nyangatom were almost peaceful from the 1940s to the 1960s. The killing, however, of more than 100 Nyangatom by the Daasanach in the 1972 Nyibilyaga War became the turning point for the repetition of large-scale wars, which reached a tentative conclusion in the Lobe War of 1991. Males now in their forties and fifties played a central role in the fighting in these wars.

The number of times an individual goes to war is influenced by whether or not large-scale wars are occurring frequently, or whether peaceful relations are being maintained during the time when a male is young and is expected to go off to war. Table 2 shows that for males in their forties to their seventies the average number of times a male participated in warfare is approximately five for all of these age, but this is a coincidental result.

2. Differences in War Opponents between Territorial Groups

However, as is clear from Table 2, there is also a large variation in the number of war experiences for males in the same age range. What is partly involved here is a difference in the territorial group to which each male belongs. Figure 3 shows the proportions of opponent ethnic groups that males from each of the territorial groups went off to war against. For each different locality of habitation of the respective territorial groups, there are differences in the people that they went off to fight with.




Figure 3: Warfare Opponents for each Territorial Group¹⁾

¹⁾ The territorial groups to which the interview survey informants belonged are as follows: Inkabelo, 83; Inkoria, 32; Randal, 30; Elele, 9; Kuoro, 8; Riele, 6; Oro, 5; Ngaritch, 1

The Inkoria territorial group, who inhabit the northeast shore of Lake Turkana, almost always fought with the neighboring Gabra or Hamar. The Ngaritch, who inhabit the northeastern part of Daasanachland only fought with the adjacent Hamar. These two territorial groups hardly ever go off to battles with the Turkana and Nyangatom living to the west of the Omo River. On the other hand, the Elele, Randal and Kuoro, who inhabit the north and northwestern part of Daasanachland mainly fight with the Turkana and Nyangatom, but rarely go to war with the Gabra and Hamar. The Inkabelo, who have the largest population and are most widely distributed geographically, and the Oro and Riele, whose populations are small and who often live with the Inkabelo, fight with the Turkana, Nyangatom and the Hamar, but seldom fight with the Gabra, who are more distant.

Sahlins has noted that although the Nuer society contains internal conflicts, because the segmentary lineage system functions as “the thermostatic mechanism for massing against the outside” (Sahlins 1961: 340), it is possible for the Nuer as a whole to unite to fight against other peoples such as the Dinka. In contrast, the Daasanach have no “thermostatic mechanism” for consolidating and organizing different territorial groups when a war occurs, and so wars always remain “local” affairs.

3. Relationship with the Life Course

Do all the males who have lived together since they were young, that is the males who belong to the same territorial group, the same generation set and the same age set, all go off to war a similar number of times? Table 3 shows the wars that eight such males have participated in in the past. Against expectations, there are differences in the wars that each of the males has participated in. For instance, informant No. 65 has been to war nine times, whereas informant No. 69 has only been once.

Table 3: Participation in Warfare by Members of the Same Territorial Group, Generation Set, and Age Set ¹⁾

Year	Name of War	Opposing People	Informant Number ²⁾							
			1	65	69	72	89	91	96	98
	Loyam	Turkana		○			?			
	Topos	Toposa					○			
1968?	Maikona	Gabra							○	
1972	Nyibilyaga	Nyangatom	○						○	○
1973	Bale	Nyangatom	○		○			○		○
Initiation Rite into Generation Set										
1976?	Buma Aaro	Nyangatom	○			○				○
	Nakwa	Nyangatom						○		
1980?	Oh El Zat	Nyangatom					○			
	Kanamagur	Turkana						○		
1987	Ai I-Artulkach	Hamar						○	○	
1988	Naikaya	Hamar		○			○			
1991	Lobebe	Nyangatom		○		○	○		○	
	Lolubai	Turkana	○							
1995?	Ai I-Lokorichie	Turkana	○	○				○		○
	Galte Batai	Turkana		○						
2000	Ai I-Shuomoi	Turkana				○	○			○
	Aiet	Turkana		○						
	Kalakwl	Turkana		○						
	Kamana	Turkana		○						
2006	Aiet	Turkana		○						
Total number of times of war participation			5	9	1	3	5	5	4	5

¹⁾ All members belong to the Inkabelo, Nigolomogin generation set, Niliabur age set.

²⁾ ○ indicates the member's participation in warfare.

How can this difference be explained? One possible explanation is that it is related to each individual's life course. Research on other pastoral societies points out that going to war or not going to war is determined by the social status in the life course. For instance, among the Samburu of central northern Kenya, the period of over ten years between the completion of the initiation rite into the age set and the marriage is the stage of the "warriorhood" (Spencer 1965). As mentioned in section I, for the Daasanach, even for members of the same age set, the timing of the later rites of passage differs.

This explanation is, however, inappropriate. Table 4 shows whether or not males have, at the time of going to war, completed the initiation rite, marriage, circumcision, and the *dimi* rite. As is clear from this table, men do go to war frequently after marriage. Further, although in proportionally smaller numbers, pre-initiation rite boys and post-*dimi* rite males, the social elders, do sometimes go off to war.

Table 4: Participation in Warfare and Life Stage¹⁾

Age	Boyhood	Post-Initiation Rite	Post-Marriage, Pre-Circumcision	Post-Circumcision, Pre-Marriage	Post-Circumcision, Post-Marriage	Post- <i>dimi</i> ²⁾	Total
10s	7	8		4	1		20
20s	19	29	22	2	10		82
30s	8	24	14	10	21	1	78
40s	15	25	17	3	65	4	129
50s	16	31	11	9	42	12	121
60s	1	22	10	5	23	2	63
70s -	5	25	13	4	20	5	72
Total	71	164	87	37	182	24	565

¹⁾ Data covers the 170 informants, who participated in warfare a total of 565 times. The life stages of the 18 times the remaining four informants participated in warfare were not surveyed.

²⁾ Since the Randal and Kuoro do not carry out the *dimi* rite, participation in warfare for the males of these two groups is set at post-*dimi* from the time after the average age at which the males of other territorial groups carry out the *dimi* rite, the mid-forties onwards.

Table 5: Males Participating in the Ai I-Shuomoi's War¹⁾

Age	Territorial Group								Total
	Inkabelo	Randal	Kuoro	Elele	Riele	Oro	Inkoria	Ngaritch	
10s	5/15	0/6	0/1		0/2	0/1	0/1		5/26
20s	9/16	2/3	3/4	0/1		0/1	0/6		14/31
30s	6/15	2/2		1/2	0/2	1/2	0/12		10/35
40s	6/11	1/5	2/2	0/3	1/1		0/6	0/1	10/29
50s	3/12	0/4	0/1	1/1	0/1		0/6		4/25
60s	0/7	0/5					0/1		0/13
70s -	0/7	0/5		0/2		0/1			0/15
Total	29/83	5/30	5/8	2/9	1/6	1/5	0/32	0/1	43/174

¹⁾ Figures denote Participating Members/Total Number of Informants

Table 5 shows the argument thus far in concrete terms. The table shows whether or not the 174 adult males participated in the Ai I-Shuomoi's War, which broke out with the Turkana in 2000. This war was one of the largest wars to occur in the previous ten years, but not one person from the Inkoria and Ngaritch, who are not neighbors of the Turkana, participated. Further, while comparatively elder members of the Inkabelo and Randal, who played a central role in the war, participated, many young men in their teens and twenties did not go.

Almagor, who conducted a survey of the Daasanach in the latter half of the 1960s, writes that, although there was conflict on a daily basis between the young men who wished to attack the enemy and the elders who tried to repress them, "(i)n an all-out war, the entire tribe is united in its goal of defeating the enemy" (Almagor 1979: 121). However, since none of the members of the distant territorial groups such as Inkoria and Ngaritch participate even in the largest war, nor did many young men of Inkabelo and Randal who were expected to go off to war, this declaration is inappropriate.

As we have seen from the above, it is not possible to explain sufficiently the variations in the number of times an individual participates in warfare simply from factors external to the individual, including historical changes in inter-ethnic relations, and differences in social organization of the group to which an individual belongs.

4. Past War Experience

A further factor that deserves attention, and one which we will focus especially on in this paper, is past war experience. What should be pointed out first is that the vast majority of adult Daasanach males have the experience of going to war at least once. Looking at Table 2, all males in their forties and above have had the experience of going to war. Of the 23 subjects whose number of participations is zero, 13 are in their teens, and it is to be expected that they will go to war as they grow older. So why is it that the remaining 10 males in their twenties and thirties have not yet gone to war?

According to the interview, three of these males had not engaged in *osu*, as we have defined war in this paper, but had engaged in *sulla*, and two of these had had the experience of killing an enemy. Four others were Christians and observed the teachings of their church that “all killing is a sin.” A further two males had decided not to go to war due to the knowledge they had gained through the process of living for a long time in a town. Only one male failed to give a clear answer.

Thus, almost all males, except those who had a clear reason for “not going to war,” having gone to war once at some point became hesitant about going to war again or completely stopped going. As we saw in the previous subsection, this change is not one that is regulated by transitions in the life course. People reflected back on their experience in past wars and “renounced war” (*osu dite*), in other words they said that they had decided not to go to war again.

Two kinds of experiences summarize the reasons why people say that they “renounce war.” One is the physical and mental anguish of the battlefield. Physical anguish is literally the experience of wavering on the very brink of life and death, with large numbers of bullets flying back and forth grazing one’s body, or becoming unable to move when transfixed by the enemy’s sorcery (*muor*) and being left behind on the battlefield, or reaching the limits of hunger and thirst. Mental anguish is that of being surrounded by blood and piles of bodies, or having returned home to the settlement after a friend who went to the war together has died, and on telling the wife and children of the death of the friend they had not stopped crying for three days, among others.

One further experience is the conflict between Daasanachs themselves on the battlefield. Regardless of age level, what those members who had “renounced war” describe is that Daasanachs do not cooperate when fighting, but rather seek war booty and the like, are jealous of each other, and deceive and put curses on one another. The content of this can be summarized under the following four points.

- (1) Members who deceived other participants in the battle to put them at a disadvantage in order to gain war booty:

Statement 1 (April 5, 2006, male in his 20s)³

(At the time of the Ai I-Shuomoi's War) we split into two squads according to generation set, the Nigabite and Nigolomogin. Then the Nigabite deceived us. It was still before dawn so we could not see very far. The Nigabite pointed to a tree and said there is a village there. Go that way. We will go to a different village. Let us all kill the Turkana. When the first cock crowed, the Turkana noticed the Daasanach first and the war began with three bullets. We went off in the direction indicated to us by the Nigabite. But there was no village there. The Nigabite deceived us because they wanted to raid livestock and kill the enemy just by themselves. We didn't get anything, we were caught under the sorcery (*muor*) of the Turkana and just felt bad.

- (2) Abandonment on the battlefield of other members who sought help:

Statement 2 (April 9, 2006, male in his 50s)

(In the Ai I-Shuomoi's War) I didn't have a gun. I went to war as a "spear-holder" ... when we were leaving the battle, I fell under the Turkana's sorcery. My legs became weak and I could not walk. I said to the young people (the speaker at that time was in his late forties) passing by, "I don't have a gun. I'll be killed by the Turkana." But everyone just ran off. As they left, they said, "We don't have a gun for you."

- (3) Scenes where violent robbery of livestock has occurred between Daasanachs themselves with respect to raided livestock:

Statement 3 (March 9, 2006, male in his 30s)

Here's another thing that happened. I went to war as a "spear-holder" and raided some livestock. But on the way home, the people who had gone to the war with guns pointed the guns at me and said, "Hand them over." I couldn't refuse. All the livestock were taken from me.

- (4) Daasanachs putting curses on each other as the result of jealousy over war booty:

Statement 4 (March 9, 2006, male in his 30s)

(At the time of the Kanamagur War) we raided four herds of small livestock. However, when we raided the livestock, it was not the person with the fire-lighting sticks that made the incisions in the enemy's livestock. Another man who was engrossed in the livestock raiding made the incisions. The person with the fire-lighting sticks was not able to carry out his role

³ The information in parentheses indicates the date of the interview, the speaker's sex and estimated age, respectively. Parentheses within statements are supplements and ellipses (...) indicate ellipsis by the author.

and did not receive even one head of livestock. For that reason he hated the other Daasanachs and on the way back to the settlement put a curse (*dor*) on them. The four herds of small livestock died on reaching the settlement. The two animals I raided also died.

The common point in these statements is that in the process of marching to war, the actual combat and the return to the settlement, as the statements below indicate, the people meet with a process of “spilling each other” (*holol okodimia*), that is, a process of loss of unity between members of the Daasanach themselves.

Statement 5 (February 28, 2006, male in his 50s)

When my children were small (in my twenties to thirties), I stopped going to war. Up until that time I had been going. Daasanach do not help each other when they fight. Those who raided livestock were the first to leave the battlefield. The people that were left behind were killed by the Turkana. People spill each other in war. In that case it's better to sit in front of the house.

Statement 6 (March 9, 2006, male in his 20s)

I went to war once when I was a boy. At that time I did not have a gun, but I was told to participate in the fighting as one of the “spear-holders” by an older man. ... I don't go to war now. I understand war now. In the battle, if you can't run fast, you are just left behind to be killed. Even if you are friends in the village, you don't help each other on the battlefield. Only your brothers will help you, the others just spill each other.

The fiercer a war becomes, the greater degree to which people “spill each other.” Table 6 shows the number of times the 43 males, who participated in the Ai I-Shuomoi's War mentioned above, went to war again following that war and up to 2006. From 2000 onward, there have been frequent wars with the Turkana, but with the exception of one man, none of the males in their forties and fifties went to war again during that period. Further, although some of the males in their teens and twenties have gone off to war a number of times, some males did not go at all and many were hesitant, going off to war only on very few occasions. These males have spoken of the sense of repulsion that arose in them from the experience of seeing with their own eyes the ferocious violence of the Ai I-Shuomoi's War and the conflict between Daasanachs themselves.

Table 6: Number of Times of Warfare Participation following the Ai I-Shuomoi's War

Age	0	1	2	3	4	Total
10s	3	1	1			5
20s	2	6	3	1	2	14
30s	6	3		1		10
40s	9	1				10
50s	4					4
Total	24	11	4	2	2	43

The people who “renounced war” stated that before they themselves went to war, they had a “young head” (*me lorich*) and were “foolish” (*dees*). They emphasize that they “renounced war” as a result of “growing” (*guadanab*) and becoming “one who has knowledge” (*maa inyasich*) after thinking carefully about their experiences on the battlefield following their return to the settlement. These utterances concerning “growing” from a “young head” do not mean biological ageing or a transition in social status from a youth to a social elder. This is because a youth in his twenties who “renounced war” after going to war only once also used these expressions.

What should be noted here is that many of these men said that, “I became a coward” (*maa sier*). For Daasanach males, being evaluated as a “coward” is an insult and the exact opposite of being evaluated as a “brave man.” Calling someone a “coward” is something which is done to provoke an opponent into a fight or when one wants to abuse someone to “make him *guof*,” as mentioned in section III. These men, however, state that they “do not become *guof*” even when abused as a “coward” by their age-mates.

The exceptional nature of these utterances becomes clear when compared with utterances concerning circumcision. Daasanach males undergo circumcision sometime between their teens and their thirties. The circumcision rite is an important event, as with war, in which males must show their “masculinity.” The person undergoing circumcision places his extended fingers on his knees and continues to gaze fixedly on his foreskin as it is cut off with a knife. If he moves his body during the circumcision, he is branded as a coward who could not tolerate the pain, and would be considered an embarrassment to the whole clan to which he belongs. In fact, many males known to the author emphasize their braveness during the circumcision. However, those same males, when relating their experiences in war, state that they have “renounced war” because they have “become cowards.” Let us take a more detailed look at this point.

5. Why Did They “Renounce War”?

As mentioned in Introduction, war is an arena in which unconcealed physical violence is collectively exercised. Rey (2001: 257), citing Levinas, has stated as follows of the unique experiences of war. “War ‘destroys the sameness of identity.’ Is this because war divides opposing peoples into two camps? On a deeper level, it destroys my identity, and at the same time eliminates all each identity, everything I depend on, and everything that makes each identity ‘real’.”

Although slightly differing from the context of the argument here, this pronouncement is in accord with the battlefield experiences related by the Daasanach who have “renounced war.” The issue in their statements is not one of a distinction between two camps, friend and foe, but of the power of violence that demolishes “our” unity and thrusts death upon “me.”

When conducting a general interview survey on war, people sometimes state the “rules of war,” such as, “Even in times of war, the elders should be respected and companions should help each other,” and, “Even if they are the enemy, women and children should not be killed.” However, what is revealed when they relate how the battlefield appeared in their own experiences is that those rules are invalid on the actual battlefield, surrounded by bodies, with large numbers of bullets flying here and there, and exposed to the danger of death. At that time, the companions that one should be able to depend on, do not care about “me” since they are protecting their own lives and making their own war gains. The “we” unity that was emphasized before setting war in motion is torn asunder by people “spilling each other” in the midst of the violence that occurs on the battlefield.

If we base our understanding on these statements, then war is not an arena in which individuals, as members of a specific political entity, unfold series of interactions according to certain rules, as is suggested by the expression, “a common ritual language...by which groups make themselves significant to each other and to themselves, as independent political entities” (Turton 1994: 26). Rather, war is experienced by people as an arena where people are exposed to unconcealed violence in a state where those rules are invalidated and “all each identity” is deprived of “everything I depend on.”

If we think of this, then the statement in the previous subsection that one has “grown” from a “young head” should possibly be understood in the following way. Daasanach males are brought up from childhood surrounded by discourses and cultural apparatuses that extol the exercise of violence against the enemy, and as they grow and accept this as their own norm for action then they do in fact go off to war. However, seeing before their eyes the death of their companions, and at the same time being faced with the loss of their own life, they gain the “knowledge” that the successes of war required to be extolled as a “brave man” are the result of abandoning one’s companions to death and conflict between Daasanachs themselves.

Through the series of interactions in which life is risked on the battlefield, they come to know that discourses and cultural apparatuses that extol the exercise of violence against the enemy are circulating in a state quite removed from the realities of their own experiences on the battlefield, and in the sense that they have gained a viewpoint that grasps these critically, they say they “grow” and have “renounced war” as “one who has knowledge,” who knows the realities of warfare.

As stated in the previous subsection, both the rite of circumcision and war are arenas where “masculinity” is shown. However, these two events have contrasting effects on individuals. In the circumcision, individuals who engage in mutual competition concerning “masculinity” are uniformly reproduced through the exercise of “ritualized violence” according to a previously agreed procedure (cf. La Fontaine 1978; Bloch 1986). In contrast, the arena of warfare, where unconcealed physical violence is expressed, produces individuals who are skeptical of the prestige-gaining game concerning “masculinity” which mobilized them for war.

They do not become “free” of this “masculinity.” As we can see from the way in which they manifest their own positions while referring to the valuation of their “masculinity” as that of being a “coward,” they remain as ever caught within that framework. At the same time, however, in that they themselves say that they have become the “coward,” in which the most negative sense of that valuation is placed, the appearance is indicated that they have of their own accord excused themselves from the prestige-gaining game based on their experiences on the battlefield.

It is in this way that the existence of males who have “renounced war” through consideration of their past experiences of warfare has become an important factor in the formation of the variation of the number of times males participate in warfare.

V. The Subject Who Experiences Together

Two questions emerge from the above argument. One is the question of how the individual’s decision to “renounce war” is accepted by the other members within a group dominated by the incitement of physical violence against the enemy. One further question is why, despite the existence of individuals critical of warfare, wars have continued over such a long period of time. I would like to argue that both of these questions are related to the Daasanach attitude towards others of respecting each individual’s self-determination.

Among the pastoral peoples of east Africa, it has been pointed out that there is a strong tendency for “individualism,” (e.g., Goldschmidt 1971) and this is true also of the Daasanach. Almagor writes that the Daasanach dislike individuals who use their superior position to have others perform certain acts, and the evaluation that “he forces people to do things” results in a significant lowering of societal evaluation (Almagor 1978a: 77-79, 1978b: 141-145). He discusses this in relation to the norms such as egalitarianism between age-mates, but I believe that the dislike of forcing others to do things and the attitude of respecting the self-determination of others is a general attitude of the Daasanach towards others that is summarized by the use of their word “stomach.”

Referring to stomach, belly, womb and interior (Tosco 2001), the Daasanach word *geer* is very often used when expressing not only bodily organs, but also things like personality, emotion, intention, and life (Table 7). For instance, a “person with a white stomach” is an honest person, “a person with a decayed stomach” is a stingy person, and “the stomach becomes cool” means that one is satisfied. It is sometimes said that the “stomach” resembles that of the name-givers, but basically each person has a different “stomach,” a different personality and a different emotional proclivity. The word “stomach” is the word that expresses the Daasanach individuality (cf. James 1988; Strecker 1999).

When the Daasanach explain or justify why they make different claims or take different actions from others, they say, “My stomach is different from other people’s stomachs,” and that they will do “only what my stomach decides.” In contrast, when carrying out something jointly with others, they appeal

to others by saying, “My stomach and your stomach are the same.” Analyzing examples of the use of the expression the “stomach is the same/different” (*geer tikidi/taka*) in Daasanach daily conversation, it is possible to see that it has the following connotations.

Table 7: Examples of Daasanach Idioms that Use the Word “Stomach”

Classification	Daasanach	Literal Meaning	Meaning
Body organ	<i>geer ya boroi</i>	the stomach shines me	I am hungry
	<i>geer abuna ie</i>	the stomach cools	the stomach is full
	<i>geer kulla</i>	the stomach is hot	the stomach are painful
Personality	<i>geer gaa misap</i>	to have a good stomach	a person with a good personality, a generous person
	<i>geer gaa diewa</i>	to have a bad stomach	a person with a bad personality, a stingy person
	<i>geer kulshach</i>	to have a munificent stomach	a compassionate person, someone who shares things with people in need
	<i>geer gaa modo</i>	to have a decayed stomach	a stingy person
	<i>geer gaa girep</i>	to have a green/ blue stomach	a liar, a deceitful person
Emotions	<i>geer gaa ezu</i>	to have a white stomach	a person who only tells the truth
	<i>geer deen naaze</i>	the stomach becomes bad	to feel unpleasant, to be apologetic
	<i>geer abuna ie</i>	the stomach becomes cool	to be satisfied, to feel that something is sufficient
Emotions	<i>geere ya duuray</i>	the stomach becomes heavy	to exceed the limit of patience or tolerance
	<i>geere ya goroy</i>	the stomach tires	tiring
	<i>geer gaa meedhe</i>	to scratch the stomach	to be happy
	<i>geer bebeme</i>	the stomach cries	to be sad
	<i>geer bilbil</i>	the stomach shakes or vibrates	to be angry
Thought, Opinion	<i>geer yadie</i>	something comes out of the stomach	a dissatisfaction is resolved, to be satisfied
	<i>geer chu fedde</i>	my stomach wants or hopes	I want or hope
	<i>geer ku hate</i>	How is your stomach?	How do you think?
	<i>geer chu takama ei mude</i>	Only my stomach decides.	I think and decide for myself.
	<i>geer chu taaka</i>	My stomach is different.	I think differently (I have a different opinion)
Life	<i>geer le ya mog</i>	I do not know his stomach	I do not know his true intention
	<i>dee geer ciru</i>	to catch a problem with the stomach	to keep something in the heart as a secret
	<i>geer dok</i>	to prod the stomach	After killing an enemy, confirming death by prodding the stomach or intestinal region with a knife or spear
	<i>geer eido, geer bie fa</i>	cut the stomach, put water in the stomach	put a curse the enemy, meaning "to kill"
	<i>geer gaa jieme, geer okode</i>	the stomach bloats, spill the stomach	If a person kills a Daasanach, his stomach bloat up, and in the end he "spills" it and dies.

Even among the Daasanach no two people have the same “stomach.” However, in living together and sharing a variety of experiences together, it is possible to build up a relationship where one can say, “My stomach and your stomach are the same.” This kind of relationship is used as the grounds for demanding something from the other person or getting the person to perform some activity together. However, people understand to some extent that shared experiences may be interpreted in different ways by each person. Of course, people may carry out some activity jointly even if they have some differences, and at that time there is discussion between the people involved. If by discussion the two parties come to think that their “stomachs are the same,” then they will probably carry out the activity together. However, if it is not possible to persuade the other person through discussion, they will not try to force their will upon the other person any further and in the end will accept the decision of the other person. As Almagor’s indication suggests, the Daasanach have a strong disliking for any kind of coercion.

This attitude of respect for the self-determination of the “stomach” of others is applied without exception in the decisions concerning warfare. The people share the perception that each individual should make his own judgment about going or not going to war based on his own standards of judgment. The surrounding people will give various kinds of advice (*atimi*), but no one can coerce the person concerned. Almost all the males who have “renounced war” state that, “Whether I go to war or not my stomach alone will decide, and my companions who hear this just say to me, ‘Stick to the village.’”

Nevertheless, we should note here that the decision of “not going to war” is absolutely a decision resulting from the grounds of the experience of having once “been to war.” The following statement indicates this well.

Statement 7 (February 23, 2006, male in his 30s)

I went to *sulla*, I saw and I knew what it was. Enough. I do not wish to kill people anymore. When I went to *sulla*, I went together with two men older than me. They said “We’re going to war,” and I went and I killed one Hamar. I knew war. Now I have grown and my own stomach decides. If the enemy attacks I will fight. But I will not go myself. Even if someone says to me let’s go, I just say “I’ve had enough.” That’s the end of it.

In order to clarify the characteristics of the process by which the right of self-determination of the “stomach” is accepted as indicated in this statement, let us compare this with the subjectification process in the theory of ideology of Althusser (1971). According to Althusser, by turning towards an interpellation from the Subject (with a capital S) such as God or State Power, a subject (with a small s) becomes a willing subject belonging to the Subject, while at the same time being guaranteed a certain amount of freedom as a subject. This image of the subject most appropriately holds for the people at the time of the setting in motion of war in a nation state, mentioned in the Introduction. The subject that can “freely” decide his actions in ordinary times is mobilized for war as a “patriotic”

homogenous subject in times of war. What is in operation there is the mechanism of state ideology apparatus that narrows the breadth of individual choices of action in the process of socialization.

The process of acceptance of the right of self-determination of the “stomach” also appears at first glance to be homologous with this notion. Youths who have not yet been to war have no logic with which to refuse the “We’re going to war” interpellation of older males. Rather, they willingly go off to fight in order to be recognized as a “brave man.”

However, the important point comes after that. On the basis of the experience of war they went off to as a response to the interpellation, they have gained the right to refuse the interpellations of others following thereafter. An individual passing through the experience of “going, seeing, and knowing what war is” becomes someone who can exercise the right of self-determination of the “stomach.” In contrast to Althusser, whose analysis claims that the very act of turning towards the interpellation creates the subservient subject, with the Daasanach the experience of the act of responding to the interpellation creates the subject who is skeptical of the ideology by which he himself was mobilized for warfare (cf. Tanaka 2005).

What should be emphasized here is the point that the member who became skeptical and “renounced war” is not individually picked on as a “coward” and excluded by the other members. The people do not impeach the member who has withdrawn from the prestige-gaining game based on the norms concerning “masculinity,” they simply accept the decision that has been made based on the reason that he has “had enough of war.” In that sense, we should think of the subject that has called on the youth not as (the agent of) the Subject that inevitably creates a subject that is subservient to himself, but as a subject who “experiences together,” who himself moves his body to go to war, and who shares with the youth the opportunity to gain “knowledge” necessary in order to judge whether or not to go to war.

The attitude of acceptance for the decision of the member who has “renounced war” becomes also at the same time a factor for the repeated occurrence of war. This is because at the same time this right to decide is applied to the male who is called the “man who likes war” (*maa osu gier*). The “man who likes war,” in contrast to the member who has “renounced war,” is the kind of person who appears to like the idea itself of going to war and even in times of calm in inter-ethnic relations attempts to attack the enemy. For instance, informant number 65 in Table 3 is a “man who likes war” who even now, at the age of about fifty, sets off on *sulla* and *osu*. The elders who have been appointed to official positions in the generation set occasionally rebuke the “man who likes war” for causing deteriorations in inter-ethnic relations. However, those elders themselves say that “they have different stomachs” and that there is no coercive means whatever of preventing him from fighting.

The “men who like war” gain war successes and the existing cultural apparatus are reproduced through the carrying out of the procedures that accompany this. Thus, new debts arise and large-scale warfare may be provoked. When the enemy attacks the Daasanach in order to “take back the debts,”

the males who have once “renounced war” may be again involved in fighting. As related in statement 7, if his own village was attacked by the enemy, he would have no choice but to fight back, and if his livestock were raided as a result of that attack, he would himself go off to war to try to raid the enemy’s livestock in order to rebuild his livestock herds. At that time, it would not be that he wishes to be recognized as a “brave man” as when he went to war for the first time, but would be heading for the enemy’s lands as an “unavoidable response” in order to continue his own livelihood.

Conclusion

Much previous research on warfare has analyzed the causes and functions of war by understanding warfare in terms of environmental factors or the level of group norms external to the individual. However, even though those factors may exist, it is not that it is automatically determined that people will go to war (cf. Fukui 1979; Abbink 1994; Strecker 1994).

The Daasanach also engage in a great deal of talk and have multiple cultural apparatuses that extol the justification of the exercise of violence against the enemy. However, many of the males who should obviously be going to war do not go. This is because people possess a viewpoint that is critical of those discourses and cultural apparatus from past experience of the battlefield, and the other members recognize the choices of action carried out based on the experiences of others on the battlefield.

The Daasanach have no institutionalized “thermostatic mechanism” whatever for the homogenous mobilization of people for war, dislike also coercion at the level of the individual and share an attitude of respect for the “stomach” of self-determination of others. They maintain a loose cohesiveness not through uniform participation in collective action based on norms and propositions external to the individual, but by sharing an attitude for the maximum mutual acceptance of the occasional decisions taken based on the past experiences of others through the logic of “differences in stomach”.

If warfare were totalized by the homogenous mobilization of the members of the group, it would eventuate in wars of total annihilation. Contrastingly, if the movement demanding peace is strongly organized, the conflict between the proponents of war or peace will likely invite a serious chasm to be created in society. Through the repetition of war over many years, while that intensity is increased by external influences, the Daasanach and their neighboring peoples have continued to exist as groups having a certain degree of autonomy without swinging to the extremity of either of these two poles. The policy of consolidation of the ethnic borders by the government since the early 20th century has perhaps been a factor contributing to this. What this paper adds to this is the inference that the maintenance of that “order” was probably possible because the various pastoral peoples of this area consist of a variety of individuals who interpret the same experience in different ways and individuals who mutually accept the decisions taken on the basis of those experiences.

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ISBN 978 4-903625-69-0