War and Peace between the Bodi and Dime of Southwestern Ethiopia

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Between 1968 and 1971 the Bodi of Gamu Gofa Province of southwestern Ethiopia attacked their eastern neighbours, the Dime, with unusual regularity and ferocity. A rough estimate of the number of Dime who died during these hostilities is 700. Many others moved from villages near the lowlands occupied by the Bodi into the highland villages which offered most protection. In addition, not less than 1,000 Dime left the area to live with neighbouring peoples. The total loss of population in Dime territory was, I estimate, somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000.

While the Dime interpreted these unprecedented hostilities as a situation of war, the Bodi saw them merely as raids. The Dime, although numerically inferior to the Bodi, had far fewer rifles, because of their long history of subjugation by Amhara soldiers, followed by settlers. They were therefore unable to retaliate against the Bodi, and received no protection from their Amhara overlords, who had a collaborative relationship with the Bodi in order to obtain cattle and the illegal products of lowland big game hunting. The war was stopped by a combination of two unpredictable factors. Firstly a visiting anthropologist involved the Ethiopian Government in the situation, and a punitive expedition was mounted. Secondly the southern neighbours of the Bodi, the Mursi, commenced hostilities against them, and distracted their attention from fighting on the northern front.

So far, the war has led to increasing Bodi encroachment on Dime territory, as well as a diminution of the Dime population. The future effects of Bodi hostilities depend largely on the wider events of post-revolutionary Ethiopia.

Between 1968 and 1971 the Bodi of Gamu Gofa Province, southwestern Ethiopia, attacked their eastern neighbours, the Dime, with unusual regularity and ferocity. These hostilities were interpreted in different ways by the two peoples involved, and I present here the Dime view of them. I examine the historical background to Bodi

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military superiority and suggest that they needed to exceed customary raiding of the Dime because of pressure exerted on them by their southern neighbours, the Mursi. I then present data to show the effects of the “War” on the Dime human and animal population, and describe the increasing encroachment of Bodi into territory which the Dime regard as theirs.

THE BODI AND DIME

The Dime of Gamu Gofa Province, who number about 8,000 people, inhabit a mountain range and, to its north-east, an area of lowland which extends as far as the River Mago. It seems likely that the boundaries of their territory have contracted in the last three decades as a result of Bodi pressure. When Haberland visited the area in 1951 he observed large Dime cattle camps in the lowlands. Now the animals graze only in the highlands.

The language, Dimaph “Mouth of the Dime”, has been classified by Fleming [1969, 1973, 1974, 1976] as a member of the southern branch of the Omotic group. Bodi belongs to the Didinga-Murle [TUCKER and BRYAN 1956] or Surma [BENDER 1971] group. The languages are therefore mutually unintelligible, and bilingualism is necessary in those regions where contact is frequent.

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**Fig. 1.** The Dime and their Neighbours

*DIME*: Tribal Groups

□ : Town
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Photo 1. The Dime Mountains from Bodi country

Photo 2. Slash and burn agriculture is practised, using digging sticks with locally-made iron tips.
The Dime practise slash and burn agriculture on terraced fields, producing grain crops such as sorghum, corn and teff, as well as ensete, roots and tubers. In the past, they owned large herds of cattle, but very few remain for reasons which I shall discuss shortly.

The Bodi (Me’en) are fewer than the Dime, numbering about 3,000, and live by transhumant cattle-herding and cultivation. They own herds of cattle which are large by current Dime standards (about 15 head per homestead), although during the late sixties and early seventies they suffered losses due to poor grazing conditions and to a disease which was probably anthrax. In peace-time, contacts between the two tribes are frequent; Bodi women come to the markets in Dimam to obtain food, salt and other items, and the men visit Dime blacksmiths to purchase weapons, tools, and bracelets. Contacts do not, however, include inter-marriage (with very rare exceptions).

The main institutionalised relationship between Bodi and Dime is that of association between men, which is largely a measure of Dime self-protection. Before the war of 1968–71, the Bodi often made rapid raids on Dime herds, and it was not uncommon for Dime, and less often Bodi, to be killed in the process. The only partial defence for a Dime against such attacks is to become the jaala (associate) of an influential Bodi, who ensures that his fellows do not attack that particular Dime. A Dime from Maga village (in the south of the country), who had several Bodi associates, explained the relationship as follows.

“At one time, about 10 years ago, the Dime had more cows than the Bodi. Most were taken by the Bodi, while others died of disease. I had 45 cows once, now [1973] I have none. One of my Bodi associates, whom I am planning to visit soon, has over 100 cows. He is fairly rich. Sometimes he brings his cows to my house in Maga to graze, and I feed them ensete and so on. Bodi never leave their cows because they want to drink their blood. They stay for three months during the dry season. They used to come up even before the war, when the Dime had many cows. We didn’t fight because we were afraid of them.

The Dime don’t admire the Bodi—they became wealthy by stealing our cows. If a Bodi sees a Dime wearing good clothes he thinks of stealing them, and may even kill the owner. They are our enemies; we don’t like them. When a Bodi comes to a Dime village as a guest, the Dime prepare food and coffee because they are afraid that if they don’t the Bodi will become an enemy and kill the man when he goes down into Bodi country. Even though they eat and drink with us, they will go and steal honey from the hive, insult the Dime and then go. They are cruel people. We are paying tax to the Bodi because we are afraid.”

It is interesting to note that the “jaala” relationship within Bodi society, from which the Bodi-Dime “jaala” relationship clearly stems, is between young age-mates, who often live in the same camp, and solicit cattle from one another (see Fukui’s article in this issue). It is thus an institutionalised relationship between equals. Such a relationship is also common between members of different tribes in the lowlands.

BODI-DIME RELATIONSHIP

Mamo Dolinde, a Dime relations as follows:

“Before Menelik the enemies apart from highlands, but too people were living Dime, and took as shields with which became slaves. People in Bongke, the Bodi. Somet custom was to can beat the Bodi rig Dime, but somet Irica and Gerfa won An Amhara in his position in this way:

“The country was the Dime had m the time they but they were few any haras came and. There were many as many. Down side of Duchu we of them. Two hundred or r told the Amhara did know there them their serva Dejazmach, and as We cannot accura many were dispersed
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where there is again a premise of equality between the partners. But in the Bodi-
Dime case the nature of the relationship is clearly different; material benefits all flow
one way, and the Dime partner gains only a somewhat unreliable security for himself
and his family. This paradoxical inferiority of the numerically and technologically
superior Dime must be explained by reference to a series of events in the region since
the southern expansion of the Ethiopian Empire under Menelik II.

BODI-DIME RELATIONSHIPS AND THE AMHARA CONQUEST

Mamo Dolinde, the Dime Chikashum (Headman), viewed the history of Bodi-
Dime relations as follows:

"Before Menelik the Dime had much livestock, crops and honey. They had no
enemies apart from occasional fighting with the Bodi. Most Dime lived in the
highlands, but took their cattle to the lowlands for better pasture. Many
people were living in Uta, but the Amharas came with Menelik, killed many
Dime, and took away their land and children. The Dime had only spears and
shields with which to fight them and they had guns, and so the Dime children
became slaves.

People in Bongke, Woide, Lashte, Dinge and Gacha used to be friends with
the Bodi. Sometimes they fought them. From the beginning, the Bodi
custom was to come at night and steal things. These Dime were brave and
beat the Bodi right across the Omo. Some Bodi had jaala amongst these
Dime, but sometimes they came and killed their friends and stole things.
Irka and Gerfa were always friends of the Bodi."

An Amhara in his sixties, who came to Dimam in about 1930, recalled the situa-
tion in this way:

"The country was more crowded then than now. Before the Amharas came,
the Dime had meat and milk all the time—they were very strong. That's
the time they built all the big terraces. The Bodi didn't raid much because
they were few and the Dime were much too strong for them. Then the Am-
haras came and killed most of them [the Dime], and the others ran away.
There were many more villages before the Amharas came, perhaps four times
as many. Down in the lowland near Balcha, and on the other [southwest]
side of Ducha were Dime with many cows, but the Amharas came and ate most
of them.

Two hundred or more Amharas lived up on Uta before Ogaden [1936]. Menelik
told the Amharas to make the Dime pay tax; they were powerful people and
didn't know there was a Government. Menelik ordered the Amharas to make
them their servants. Twenty Dime were given to one Fitawrari, thirty to one
Dejazmach, and so on. It wasn't a long fight."

We cannot accurately estimate how many Dime died during the conquest, or how
many were dispersed by the slave-traders and soldiers, but Haberland's guess [1959:
that the pre-Amhara population of Dimam was at least 20,000 is probably not too much of an exaggeration. Certainly the vast extent of terraced land now covered by dense forest and the large number of village remains suggest such numbers.

The Amhara continued:

"Many Amharas hunted lions, buffalo, elephants, giraffes and rhinoceri in Chirim and Suruch near the River [that is, in Bodi country]. Traders came and followed the hunters when they went to kill elephants—it wasn’t forbidden then. One tusk cost between 750 and 900 Ethiopian dollars. One buffalo skin they exchanged for one heifer."
The Amharas went down and shot many Bodi and took their cows, but they didn’t want to live there because it was too hot and there was much disease. They sold some as slaves. They traded guns with the Bodi—exchanged guns for cows. Mostly they sold guns to the Bodi when they came back from the Ogaden, because they had many spare guns. So gradually the Bodi got many guns. When the Italians came, the Bodi had some guns, but the Italians took them and burned them, so after the Italians left, the Bodi needed guns and the Amharas exchanged one gun for 12 cows."

Before the Bodi were able to obtain guns from Amhara traders, the Dime had a further advantage over them to which I have previously briefly alluded. The Dime mountains contain iron ore, which was smelted by members of the Blacksmith “caste” and forged into weapons and tools. These iron objects were traded with many neighbouring people, including the Bodi. So, in addition to being less numerous than the Dime, the Bodi were dependent on them for the best available weapons, which they needed in order to defend themselves against their southern neighbours the Mursi. The Dime herded their numerous cattle in the lowlands near Bodi, and there is said to have been intermittent and small-scale cattle raiding within a period of general peace. In view of the superior numbers and military technology of the Dime, it seems likely that they had the upper hand over the Bodi, as Dime and Amhara tradition asserts.

Unfortunately for the Dime the pleasant highlands of their territory, and the relative ease with which they could produce large quantities of food, made Dimam an ideal place for colonising Amharas to settle, whereas Bodi territory was suitable only for short but profitable hunting expeditions. Naturally, having settled in the area, subjugated the people and established a very comfortable livelihood, the Amhara settlers ensured that the Dime did not have access to the resource on which the new order was based, fire-arms. At the same time, trading guns and bullets to the Bodi not only brought the settlers an immediate return, but ensured a continuing supply of the products of big game hunting, from which many of them made large fortunes by Ethiopian standards.

Most of the Amharas who went to fight in the Ogaden campaign of 1936 did not return to Dimam; and, when it became clear that the abolition of slavery was going to be enforced, others drifted away from the area. Those who remained now owned considerable areas of land, and retained many “servants”, but were less able to force the Dime to work without reward. Obviously, the fewer their numbers, the more imperative it became for them to retain the monopoly of firearms. This they were able to do with the aid of a new set of allies, the police, who established a post in Gerfa in the 1940’s. Policemen, if not always Amhara, were at least Christians and sons of freemen, and the settlers rapidly established good relations by finding wives for the newcomers and by patronage in the form of money and food. In return the police ensured that any Dime who disobeyed an Amhara was beaten and fined. Later, when gun licences became necessary, the police again helped by enforcing the law rigidly on the Dime, whilst turning a blind eye to Amhara infringements. Am-
hara traders continued to exchange guns and bullets with the Bodi in return for ivory, skins and cows even during the early 1970's. A few of the major Amharas even claimed to own land in Bodi territory, and received tribute of various kinds from their tenants. The Amhara settlers needed to keep the Dime weak, but to ensure a cooperative relationship with the Bodi who provided them with valuable trade items. These aims they achieved by denying guns to the Dime whilst selling them to the Bodi. If they appreciated the implications of these actions, they did not heed them.

BODI-MURSI RELATIONS

The Bodi and their southern neighbours the Mursi speak closely related languages of the Didinga-Murle/Surma group, which are not, however, mutually intelligible. The Mursi, like the Bodi, derive their livelihood from a combination of cultivation and cattle-herding. Turton ([1978] and his article in this issue) has argued that there has been, and is, taking place a northward movement, punctuated by periodic warfare, of Mursi speaking people into former Bodi territory. During the long periods of peace, which may last up to twenty years, most northern Mursi develop relationships of economic co-operation with Bodi "associates". A Mursi may even farm in the cultivation area of his Bodi friend. In this way a gradual "territorial encroachment" takes place even during peace-time. The purpose of a war, Turton argues, is to bring about a peace-making ceremony which ratifies the territorial gain begun by cultivation in Bodi country.

Clearly, this pressure on the Bodi from the south has made them look for new territory to their north. An advance into Dimam was attractive for two reasons.

THE QUI

The hostilities are not surprising events with the Amharas. In d (see his article) did not prevail than those who had regarded the killing of a Dime man was a war with the Amhara.

In the situation the men and no crops were sold without the selling of ghee and without the market, etc., etc. Alth
Firstly rainfall in Dimam is both more plentiful and more reliable than that in the lowland, so that agriculture and pasture-land are both more predictable. Secondly, as I have already shown, the Dime were in no position to retaliate, even though more numerous than the Bodi. When raiding on the Dime increased to such an extent that they talked of war, in about 1968, the Bodi had been at peace with the Mursi since about 1954, and had therefore been able to build up supplies of ammunition and rifles for more than 14 years.

Hostilities between Bodi and Mursi differ from those between Bodi and Dime significantly. In the former case there are institutionalised methods of announcing and terminating hostilities; there are "rules of war". Such rules are, perhaps, a necessity, since the two tribes are similar in number and weapons. But between the Bodi and Dime rules do not exist, nor is there any reason why they should, since the Dime are unable to offer successful resistance. This lack of rules is also perhaps evidence of a cultural difference between highlanders (cultivators) and lowlanders, and between representatives of two distinct language groups.


The Dime plausibly maintain that in recent decades they have never initiated hostilities against the Bodi because the latter have far more guns. It is therefore not surprising that the accounts I received from the Dime and Amharas of the events which precipitated the war (as opposed to its underlying cause) all involved Amharas.

In describing this conflict as a war I am adopting the Dime view of it. Fukui (see his article in this issue) has shown that the Bodi did not share this view, but regarded their actions against the Dime as raiding, a category distinct from war. They did not perform the rituals appropriate to war, and their raiding parties were smaller than those which gather for this category of hostility. From the Dime viewpoint the situation was not one of "normal" raiding, since attacks were relatively frequent, and the killing, which continued even after the Bodi had taken the great majority of Dime cattle, was on a relatively large scale. As far as they were concerned this was a war, of the same type as that waged against them many years previously by the Amhara.

In the years before the war the governmental Sub-District (Wereda) headquarters was in Garo, in the lowland at the northeast of Dimam, and there were many policemen and local government officials living in this village. Since these outsiders had no crops of their own, a market was set up in Garo, and rapidly became popular, not only with the Dime, but with members of several other tribes. Bodi women came to sell ghee and meat, and buy grain and ensete. Policemen and government workers without wives began to rape or even gang rape the Bodi women on their way from market, and minor atrocities were committed against them. The Bodi stopped coming to market and began to kill traders on the paths into Dimam.

Although the attacks on their women were made by "Amharas" (a term which is
extended to include any government official of whatever ethnic identity), the Bodi never systematically retaliated against the offending group, but instead attacked their “servants”, the Dime. This seems to have been for two reasons. Firstly, the Amharas would certainly have rapidly appealed for help to the District or Sub-Provincial Government, if there had been a concerted attack against them. As long as the dead were almost exclusively Dime, the Amharas remained relatively unconcerned, and may even have felt that the losses in tithes they suffered were outweighed by the increasing dependence of the remaining Dime on them, as possessors of almost all of the guns in the territory, and men believed to have contacts with government personnel in Basketo.

Secondly, any Bodi campaign against the Amharas would, sooner or later, have resulted in the closure of one of their main supply lines of guns and ammunition. Much of this material went through the hands of Amharas resident in Dimam before reaching the Bodi. Even traders from outside the area had to pass through it on their way to Bodi country, and would not have been allowed to do so by the local Amharas and police if they had expected the bullets being sold to be fired at them. The importance of Amhara traders to the Bodi was emphasised by both Amharas and Dime, and the death of one of these was popularly cited as another trigger of the war. The Amhara priest of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Dimam told me:

“An Amhara in Gerfa named Tarafe was a good friend of the Bodi. He used to exchange bullets for cows, and also traded tusks and leopard skins for bullets. In 1961 [by the Ethiopian Calendar; that is 1968] the Dime had many cows, crops and tobacco. Bodi came up to Dimam for crops and tobacco. The Dime were proud because they had so many animals and crops and didn’t let the Bodi into their houses or drink beer from the same gourd, because they regarded them as low. The Bodi had many guns and bullets, and asked their friend Tarafe if they could kill the Dime and steal their animals. He said they could, and moved his home [from Gerfa].”

After he had moved home to a village near Garo, he was involved in a series of crimes which resulted in him killing a Dime, whose brother promptly killed him. The priest concluded, “When the Bodi heard that the Dime killed their master, they began to kill the Dime.”

THE WAR OF 1968-1971

In 1968 Bodi raids against the Dime became more frequent, and began to involve more killing. During the next two years large numbers of cattle were taken and many Dime were killed. During periods of “normal” Bodi raiding, the main purpose is to acquire as many cattle as possible, and Dime are killed only when they attempt to thwart the raids. But during the war, killing seemed to become an objective in itself, and occurred in situations involving no cattle. In some instances, Bodi set fire to the thatched roofs of Dime huts and murdered the occupants as they came out. In
others, they simply waited until people left the house at dawn to visit the bush, and beat or stabbed them to death. There were no restrictions on who was killed—old men, women and children were targets as often as young men. Numerous atrocities occurred.

As a result of the killings, people were afraid to work on their farmland, which was in many cases far removed from the nearest village, in case the Bodi caught them alone. They also stopped leaving children to guard the crops from birds and animals. Naturally, the crops were very poor. Traders did not come to market, so that they could not buy food to make up for these deficiencies. Many people slept in the bush rather than present an obvious target in their homes. Large numbers of people left Dimam altogether, and set up home in Siddo, Malo and Basketo. Others moved within the country.

In 1973, I collected census information on 191 Dime adults, including some concerning the more quantifiable effects of the war. It was not possible to collect the sample according to any statistically valid procedure, and the numbers reported and my extrapolations from them are only intended to give an extremely approximate estimate of the magnitude of the losses suffered by the Dime. Nevertheless I feel that data concerning inter-tribal warfare in Africa, gathered soon after the event, are sufficiently rare to excuse the unavoidable lack of statistical precision.

My sample had a marked bias towards four villages in the north-east of Dimam; it included the entire adult population of Wocho village (in which I spent most of my time), totalling 49 people, as well as 22 from Garo, 13 from Gaiz and 11 from Dinge. Thus, nearly half of the sample came from the region which is most heavily populated, and in which most of the Amharas live.

The 191 people interviewed reported a total of 31 kinsmen killed during the war. I estimate the number of adult Dime to be about 3,500, so that an extrapolation from this sample would produce a figure in excess of 500 deaths. If we consider that the sample greatly under-represented those villages nearest the Bodi, we must assume that the actual number killed was much higher than this. Mamo Badjji, the chief of Uta throughout the war period told me that police records showed only 280 dead, but that this included only officially reported deaths, and not those which occurred in villages away from the two police posts, in Gerfa and Garo, or deaths of people travelling between villages. His own estimate of the dead was between 700 and 1,000, which coincides very well with the suggestion derived from my census data.

Returning to the sample, 191 people reported 287 cattle successfully stolen by the Bodi, and 112 stolen but recaptured. Approximately two-thirds of those interviewed were men, who own almost all of the cattle in Dimam. If we assume that the sample has a fairly typical ratio of cattle-owners (before the war) to non-cattle-owners, an extrapolation suggests that nearly 3,000 cattle were stolen. It is probable that respondents exaggerated their losses, but this gain is almost certainly corrected by the higher numbers which would have been produced from a sample more representative of the "front-line" villages.

With regard to movements within the country, 28 members of the sample had
moved village to reduce the possibility of being raided. Moves showed a clear tendency away from lowland villages, especially those of the north east, notably Gacha, Balo and Gargoda (which was in fact completely deserted by the time of my arrival), into those on higher land, particularly those in the chieftdom of Uta. Such a move brought several advantages. Firstly, cows stolen from the highlands were much more likely to be retrieved. Secondly, the concentration of population in Uta was felt to provide some deterrent to the Bodi. Thirdly, the relative cold of the highlands made it uncomfortable for intruders used to the lowland whilst they waited through the night in order to attack early in the morning.

It is not possible to estimate how many Dime left the country to live elsewhere, but from the numbers which were suggested to me, it seems likely that more than 1,000 people were involved. Some of these had already returned by early 1973.

The Dime were never in a position to counter-attack the Bodi on any scale because of their lack of firearms, and the few casualties on the Bodi side were suffered almost entirely during the process of driving stolen cattle back to Bodi country.

The Amharas resident in Dimam made no efforts to bring an end to the war by fighting alongside the Dime, lending them guns, or bringing pressure to bear on the Government at any level to take action against the Bodi. It is impossible to say how far the Bodi offensive would have progressed before the Amharas decided that action was necessary, had not events taken an entirely unpredictable turn.

The American anthropologist and linguist Prof. H. Fleming arrived in Dimam
in 1971 and soon realised that the Dime were in danger of total collapse under the increasing Bodi attacks. He reported the problem to the central Government and to local officials in Basketo and Felega Neway. As a result, an expedition composed of army and police personnel was sent into Bodi territory, and removed four of their most influential men to jail in Felega Neway, the Sub-Provincial Headquarters. They also confiscated some rifles, took punitive action against Bodi settlements, and returned to the Dime a small number of cattle, all of which later died of disease.

It is, however, probable that it was not this expedition alone which halted Bodi hostilities, since, further south, four such Government manoeuvres were staged against the Dassanech without success, while in Hamar territory the military resorted to the aerial bombing of villages. It seems likely that the outbreak of hostilities between the Mursi and Bodi in 1971 turned the attention of the latter tribe southwards, and combined with Government intervention to save the Dime from further attacks.

THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON THE DIME

The most obvious effect of the war on the Dime was that many of them left the country, and will probably never return. A similar number died. The population has therefore declined by somewhere between 1,000 and 3,000, which is a considerable loss for a people who did not originally number more than perhaps 11,000.

The loss was not spread evenly, but affected particularly the villages of the northeastern lowland, and along the western foothills of the Dime mountain range. Some villages were actually abandoned, others are now inhabited by only two or three families.

Before the war, the Bodi had large stockaded cattle-camps in the region around Gerfa and Irka. Here, they grazed their cattle on the land of their Dime associates, and were able to set up temporary villages during the worst of the dry season. But, since the war, the Bodi have moved into Dimam on a larger scale, particularly in Irka and the villages of the northwest. Here, the new settlements are different from the “traditional” cattle camps. The immigrants are young couples and unmarried men who come not to herd cattle for a few months, but to plant, tend and harvest crops. In late 1973, in the lower hamlet of Irka, there were about 50 resident Bodi growing corn and sorghum, and living in the dome-shaped huts characteristic of the Bodi, which are ill-adapted to the climate of the foothills. These people had no cows whatsoever with them, and said that their elder brothers or other relatives were tending the family herds near the Omo River, which is nearly two day’s walk away. They are thus the forerunners of semi-permanent Bodi settlement in Dimam. Since Bodi cattle have suffered from disease and from the poor grazing left by the near drought conditions of recent years, and since their crops must also have been poor, settlement in the highlands, where rain is more reliable, must seem to some Bodi one of the best hopes for the future. With the harrowing experience of the recent war fresh in their minds, the Dime are in no position to object to this expansion into their territory, even though they certainly have no desire to live in daily contact with the Bodi.
The "associate" relationship between Bodi and Dime displays interesting differences from that which obtains between Bodi and Mursi. The expanding and numerically superior Mursi use their associate relationships as part of the "peaceful infiltration" (see Turton’s article in this issue) of Bodi country which precedes each outbreak of war. The contracting but numerically superior Dime require Bodi associates in order to reduce the possibility of becoming victims of Bodi raids. The Bodi involved gain far more materially than their Dime partners—grazing rights, tobacco, honey and crops. If we look at the situation from the Bodi viewpoint, we might say that they are using the associate institution to infiltrate Dime territory, in the same way that the Mursi have used it against them. But in the Dime-Bodi case it is the retreating party which seeks the partnership, not the expanding one.

The war has therefore enabled the Bodi to establish agricultural settlements in the Dime foothills. This is in accord with Turton's evidence that Mursi-Bodi wars and ensuing peace settlements have enabled the Mursi to expand northwards. In the case of the Dime-Bodi war, however, the Bodi had such superiority of arms that they did not need to consider making peace, and we can only speculate as to what would have happened but for Fleming's chance arrival, and the outbreak of Mursi-Bodi hostilities.

We are not yet in a position to estimate what will be the result of the northward movement of the Bodi. They and the Dime, it will be remembered, are not members of the same language group, and cannot therefore coalesce as easily as the territorial
sections of the lowland cattle herders discussed by Turton. The two may remain distinct peoples, living in "peaceful co-existence" but this seems unlikely. Fukui has reported (personal communication) renewed Bodi attacks on the large villages of "Uta" (probably Wocho) and Garo in early 1976. How the Dime will cope with these attacks is problematic; they may lead to a large exodus from the area, since the villages under attack were those considered to be relatively safe. There might then develop a hierarchical social structure of cattle owners and agriculturalists of the Tutsi-Hutu type. This could presumably only occur in the absence of Amhara land-owners, and it is not clear whether those resident in Dimam have survived the revolution and its aftermath. Further speculation is unlikely to be fruitful until the place of these peoples on the wider canvas of Ethiopian politics becomes clear.

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